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Old 11-18-2006, 07:43 PM   #1 (permalink)
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i have difficult article I want your help please can you translate in Arabic or simple english to understand better

The Elusiveness of Deception Beliefs
While current research has shed much light on deception, an approach that addresses
deception-related beliefs may offer assistance in developing process models that
explain and illustrate a ‘‘speaker’s ability to lead the listener to a predefined thought
or action’’ (Deetz, 1990, p. 230). The following review addresses a variety of factors
that play a part in deception. As the purpose of this study is to explore the notion that
there is a composite set of deception-related beliefs, we must begin by identifying and
defining concepts that may comprise that set. A reasonable starting place would be to
focus on one or more interesting concepts (Chaffee, 1991). This following section
outlines five focal concepts on which this project is based.
Upbringing
Studies have addressed the impact of upbringing on deception. Upbringing consists
of past experiences one collects and brings into future encounters. Past experiences
have a large hand in shaping people’s likelihood to deceive (Cole & Mitchell, 1998).
Although upbringing may teach people aspects about the acceptability of deception
or its moral implications, the uniqueness of upbringing is primarily based on
information we receive from outside sources.
Recent studies have uncovered a great deal about how children learn to disclose
false information. In a longitudinal study of children’s lies in naturalistic settings,
Wilson, Smith, and Ross (2003) found that parents who ignore or believe a child’s lie,
or punish falsely accused siblings were more likely to have children who frequently
lied later on. They found that the number of children who disclose false information
378 J. C. Scholl & D. O’Hair
increased dramatically between the ages of two and four, and that older children tell
more sophisticated lies. As children move into adolescence and begin to manipulate
information to manage their privacy boundaries (Mazur & Hubbard, 2004), it
becomes an issue of what the lie is about, such as, ‘‘where I was,’’ ‘‘my sexual
behavior,’’ ‘‘who I was with,’’ and ‘‘my alcohol use’’ (Knox, Zusman, McGinty, &
Gescheidler, 2001).
Perhaps one’s upbringing provides opportunities for developing certain skills (use
of facial animation, use of ‘‘we’’ pronouns) that lead to success in deception. Such
traits as Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970) or one’s trust of others’ motives
(Wrightsman, 1964, 1974) are partially learned from important others and may
contribute to deception. Upbringing, as a concept, may vary in terms of one’s view
toward deception or what has been learned via upbringing. Nonetheless, an
exploration into what this constructs means to individuals may give future scholars
a clue as to how this concept may vary across situations (i.e., exist as a variable)
(Chaffee, 1991).
Acceptance
Another factor may be the extent to which deception is viewed as normative behavior.
From the formative years all the way through the rest of their lives, people continue to
develop their ideas about appropriate behavior. A look at acceptance is warranted
because people rely on subjective norms when determining what acceptable communication
behavior is. Communicators think of the opinions about deception held
by others, and if those important others have an overall favorable opinion of deception
in a particular situation, communicators may take that information into account.
The acceptance of deception may depend on the recipient of the deceit, as well as
the perceived importance of information. McCornack and Levine (1990) developed a
lie acceptability measure to examine emotional reactions and relational outcomes as
consequences of discovered relational deception. In measuring type of emotion,
importance of information, and importance of the lie, they found that more than
two-thirds of their respondents terminated their relationship due to a discovered lie,
with nearly all of the terminations initiated by the lie recipient. Levine, McCornack,
and Avery (1992) built on McCornack and Levine’s (1990) work by investigating sex
differences in lie acceptability. They found that women judged lying as less acceptable
than did men; women also were more likely to perceive the act of lying as significant
and to report negative emotional reactions. In general, the acceptance of deception is
arguably an important factor in the decisions people make regarding their closest
relationships.
The perceived acceptance of deception may also vary depending on the relationship.
Seiter, Bruschke, and Bai (2002) found that when protecting one’s privacy,
deceiving strangers and friends is acceptable. When lying to parents, deception is
perceived acceptable if it is intended to benefit the target. Seiter et al. (2002) also
found that, although motive was a stronger predictor than culture, US participants
Communication Quarterly 379
found lying to parents more acceptable than did Chinese participants, who deemed it
more acceptable to lie to spouses to protect privacy.
People have contradictory views regarding the acceptance of deception. Boon and
McLeod’s (2001) study of romantic couples revealed that while partners believed in
honesty in a relationship, they had little trouble identifying acceptable conditions for
lying. Cole (2001) concludes, ‘‘Without a doubt, complete disclosure fails to depict
the nature of communication between romantic partners’’ (p. 107). The contradictory
nature of deception is also seen in the tension between civil laws and everyday
practices. Nyberg (1993) argues that our civil codes tell us when the truth is required
(e.g., giving court testimony), and when exceptions can be made (e.g., protecting
one’s privacy).
There is a slight danger in accepting deception as a necessary evil. Kalbfleisch
(2001) found that messages intended for relational maintenance were not positively
correlated with messages with deceptive intention. She concludes, ‘‘Simply believing
that we are telling lies for the good of our partner and our relationship may well be
the biggest deceit of all’’ (p. 228). Although acceptability of deception has moral
implications, it should not be considered synonymous with morality, which involves
choices of what is right or wrong. An act that is deemed socially appropriate, normal,
or easy in a situation may not be the right thing to do.
Ethics (Morals)
Ethics is described here as the consideration of what is right and wrong. Ethics can be
nurtured during upbringing, and comes into play as people make choices beyond
their formative years. The reason for considering ethics is two-fold. First, deception is
an emotionally charged issue fueled by debates over when it is right or wrong
(Backbier, Hoogstraten, & Terwogt-Kouwenhoven, 1997; Deetz, 1990). Second, ethics
is rarely included as a measured construct in deception-related studies, even though it
frequently emerges in deception-related writings and discussions. Perhaps this is
because concrete ethical problems and ethical theory are difficult to grapple with
(Bok, 1989).
Interactants generally expect their partners to be sincere (Cole, 2001) and Deetz
(1990) argues that a reliance on trust is a key in this expectation. Deetz (1990)
contends that if people think deception will obstruct the shared meaning within the
message, deception would be undesirable. Furthermore, Bok (1989) argues that
deception can victimize the recipient. ‘‘Most harm that can befall victims through
violence can come to them also through deceit. But deceit controls more subtly, for it
works on belief as well as action’’ (p. 18).
If ethics is a construct with certain attributes, one might look to common ethical
perspectives, one of which is Kant’s (1964) categorical imperative. Kant argues that if
people are contemplating an action, they must decide whether they would have other
people engage in that action. If not, they should avoid it. Utilitarianism, another
perspective, stipulates that when we have a choice among actions, we should pursue
380 J. C. Scholl & D. O’Hair
the action that promotes the best possible consequences for everyone involved
(Bentham, 1948). Another perspective may be to question whether there is an
‘‘absolute truth’’ and to decide to make up one’s own rules when choosing between
truth and deception (Bok, 1989). This perspective holds that if we can never
completely know the truth about anything, then it does not really matter whether we
lie, as long it is for a good reason. Bok (1989) contends that such arguments open
people up to inadequate information, which in turn can lead to an unreasonable
conclusion*/‘‘one that gives carte blanche to what those who lie take to be wellmeant
lies’’ (pp. 12/13).
Motives
Motives are defined here as underlying reasons for deceiving, often brought about by
situational constraints. There are identifiable reasons why people may lie, such as
maintaining relational balance, avoiding punishment, and achieving a desired
intimacy level (Cole, 2001). Green and Farber (2000), drawing on results of their
study of medical residents, also assert that people lie to avoid embarrassment and
ridicule. Motives have a substantial influence on deceiving. Three-quarters of
Hample’s (1980) respondents reported situations in which it is ‘‘impossible’’ to tell
the truth, and Bell and DePaulo (1996) concluded from their study that the more
difficult situations are especially challenging when people are emotionally invested in
them. Nonetheless, the decision to use deception may be a way to react to seemingly
uncontrollable circumstances, particularly when the individual lacks the efficacy to
deal with them in more honest ways. Moreover, the same motive that compels one to
lie may not be the one that encourages truth telling. People are capable of telling either
a truth or a lie for the same motive of serving one’s own interests. However, that selfserving
interest may not be served equally well by both the truth and a lie in the same
situation. For example, if one were to avoid embarrassment by lying about a past
behavior, being honest about that past behavior may actually bring embarrassment
upon the truth teller in that same situation, rather than protect him or her from it.
Deceptive motives have been shown to correlate with type of relationship (Seiter
et al., 2002). For instance, lies are told more often in casual relationships than in close
ones (Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu, White, & Rockwell, 1996). Alternatively, DePaulo and
Bell (1996) found that deception happens more often with close interactants than
with those not as well liked. Blair, Nelson, and Coleman (2001) claim that research on
relational deception is still at a very early stage, and they suggest that future research
go into more detail about the factors influencing the selection of deception strategies
depending on the relationship type and situation.
Intentionality
Inherent in many conceptualizations of deception is intentionality. Intentionality may
be an issue of agency. If agency were in the person, the conscious thought of
Communication Quarterly 381
deception may be in that person’s mind before that act is committed. On the
contrary, agency may be elsewhere, such as an unforeseen circumstance contributing
to an act, thus implying less intentionality on the part of the agent. Bandura (2001)
argues that an intention is not just an anticipation of a future action, but a
commitment to bring about that action. In general, the more intention with which
one engages in deception, the more individuals act as autonomous agents who
experience their events, rather than simply ‘‘undergo’’ them (Bandura, 2001).
Another perspective is self-awareness (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975), defined as
awareness of oneself in social situations. Malcolm and Keenan (2003) found a
relationship between Fenigstein et al.’s (1975) self-awareness construct and the ability
to detect deceit; the more self-aware a person is, the more likely that person is able
to detect deception. Given that communication can be executed at various levels of
self-awareness, further exploration of the intentionality construct may inform our
current views of deception.
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