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Hello ! Here are some words or expressions (in bold) I cannot translate in french. I propose my translation, I do not know if it is correct. Many thanks for your help.



Hayek’s position concerning social reforms is, at the very least, fuzzy. On the one hand, he is not very pleased with the idea of piecemeal social engineering, as dear as it is to his friend Popper. On the other hand, Hayek offers some radical propositions for reform of the constitution or the currency. He even accepts that all traditions are in principle open to discussion.[why not opened ?].

De Vlieghere believes that it is this third idea that causes Hayek to take a selfcontradictory position and, in particular, to pay only lip-service to piecemeal social engineering. De Vlieghere’s argument is the following. There exists a two-pronged analogy between technological evolution and institutional evolution [ Il existe une analogie le terme two-pronged ne se traduirait pas en français…]


According to De Vlieghere, these analogies must also follow the same logic of
modification: the impossibility of reconstructing the productive apparatus does not preclude the agents from using it, nor from introducing novelties or suggesting inventions. Ignorance about the background [découverte ici ?] of technology does not eliminate the possibility of deliberate invention.


De Vlieghere argues that Hayek’s objection comes from his belief that
the reformer as well as the engineer needs complete knowledge in order to achieve even these partial projects. By contrast, De Vlieghere argues that in fact neither needs to have complete knowledge [De Vlieghere affirme qu’en fait, personne n’a besoin d’avoir… ?]

The very first computers and cars were produced using a production apparatus that was not foreseen previously for those kinds of products. That this productive apparatus has since undergone modifications that led to a greater functionality does not speak to its hesitant beginnings.

On retrouve le terme dans une autre phrase :
The second reason speaks to the impossibility of reconstructing tacit
knowledge completely. De Vlieghere (1994, 290) believes that this impossibility
comes from the fact that “reason can not compete with the cumulative force of the long term institutional fixation of knowledge.” This assertion means that he not only identifies implicit knowledge with the knowledge imbedded in the productive apparatus but — more importantly — with a knowledge that one cannot reconstruct because its background [origine ?] lies in a faraway past.


In terms of partial institutional reform, this means that we cannot reconstruct our institutions because their evolutionary traces have disappeared; rather, we cannot reconstruct institutions because it is impossible to access their traces even in principal [en théorie ?] We cannot articulate and transmit the required knowledge verbally. For us to articulate it [pour que nous puissions l’articuler ?] our reason would have to go beyond or outside of these traces.

Vanberg does not propose to deny the existence of a grand tension in Hayek’s program for liberalism. He formulates that tension in terms of simultaneous presence in Hayek’s thought of rationalist liberalism and evolutionary agnosticism. For Vanberg, Hayek’s rationalist liberalism lies within [ = lies in, repose sur ? ] his collection of arguments in favor of the establishment and maintenance of a liberal order.


Unfortunately,
his argument doesn’t stop there. In effect, his proposal to reconcile the two aspects amounts to subjugating Hayek’s evolutionism to his rational liberalism. And, in that sense, Vanberg’s reconciliation falls foul of our interpretation of Hayek’s theory and, for reasons that we will suggest, leads to a dead end.


Vanberg’s reconciliation strategy depends essentially on a distinction
between two types of evolutionary proposition: conditional evolutionary
propositions and unconditional ones. According to this distinction, a proposition is unconditional if it speaks to evolution per se and leaves unspecified the constraints under which an evolutionary process functions.


Proposing a
reinterpretation of Hayek in light of this distinction, Vanberg concludes that
Hayek’s evolutionism consists only in conditional evolutionary propositions.
To buttress his rereading, Vanberg takes up Hayek’s defense [reprend la défense de Hayek ?] of the market.

The reconciliation between rationalism and evolutionism in Hayek
cannot succeed unless this strategy, which appears to succeed in the case of the market, can generalize [se généraliser ?] to the case of cultural evolution.


Recall once again that Hayek considers reason itself to be the product of the rules, which thus make sit impossible [which is the difference between “make impossible” and “make sit impossible ? ] that reason could choose among the general rules of conduct.


There is also general agreement that the
endogenous enforcement of contracts [la realisation endogène de contrats ? ] is a major problem in the description of how markets work, and that rational behavior does not exclude the emergence of conventional behavior in the aggregate (for example, see Kreps 1990: 723-4, and Milgrom and Roberts 1990). In this paper I will discuss the relevance of Hayek's
analysis of co-ordination of differently informed agents for the theory of
competitive markets as seen from this broader perspective [ considéré dans cette perspective plus large ?]


Little attention has been paid, on the other hand, to the question of
whether Hayek considers competitive markets as an institution performing just an allocative function. Recent developments in microeconomic theory have shown that a comparative analysis of feasible alternative institutions [ je ne comprends pas l'utilité du mot alternative ici ] cannot be confined
to the comparison between market and planned economies


The next section reviews the unifying role performed by personal knowledge in Hayek's long standing contribution [contribution largement connue ? ] to both economic theory and social philosophy, and briefly compares the notions of private information and personal knowledge.


Secondly, Hayek's critical remarks on the view held by the
supporters of planned economies show that he was aware of the shortcomings implicit in Walrasian equilibrium analysis of "objective data" right from the start [immédiatement après le début ?] of the debate on socialist calculation, in contrast to the widespread [répandue ?]view that he dealt with this problem only in the second phase of the debate